the palestinian resistance

Watch on meejana.tumblr.com

First in the video series on Palestinian music. This song is called Yama Mwel el Hawa, يما مويل الهوى. This is a cultural resistance song made popular during the first Intifada by Firqat Al-3ashiqin, or ‘The Lovers’. 

Lyrics:

يما مويل الهوا يما مويليا
ضرب الخناجر ولا حكم النذل فيا
ومشيت تحت الشتا والشتا رواني
والصيف لما أتى ولع من نيراني
بيضل عمري انفدى ندر للحرية
يا ليل صاح الندى يشهد على جراحي
وانسل جيش العدا من كل النواحي
واليل شاف الردى عم يتعلم بيا
بارودة الجبل أعلى من العالي
مفتح درب الأمل والأمل برجالي
يا شعبنا يا بطل أفديك بعينيا

Translation (loose):

Chorus:

Oh mother, the wind is blowing

(We would prefer)The blows of daggers rather than a villainous leader


I walked in the winter, and the winter kept me company

And the summer, when it came, lit the fire in my heart

The life given to resistance in the pursuit of freedom is not wasted 

Chorus

‘Oh night!” the morning dew cried as it witnessed my injury

Even as the occupying army surrounded me from every corner

But the night saw my response, and learned from me

Chorus

The rifle in the mountain stands taller than tall

A key, the cornerstone of our hope, and the hope in our men

Oh our nation, oh heroes, I answer your call with my soul

Watch on pxlestine.tumblr.com

For the sake of Palestine and its children! - Tfu

3

Members of the Palestinian youth movements, the Ashbal. The Ashbal-literally, the cubs- saw themselves, and were seen by Palestinian society, as an elite group who excelled not only in sports, but also in combat. 

The Ashbal weapon was the RPG, known in the Soviet Union, where it is manufactured, as “The weapon of the brave”. The Ashbal were expected to fight like “ten fedayeen”. “Every grenade in an RPG costs 34 liras, and you only have six, so don’t waste them” they were told. “Don’t hit your target”- usually a tank-”until it gets close to you, and then immediately move away”

The Israelis dubbed them “the RPG kids” during their 1982 invasion of Lebanon for the devastating number of hits they scored with their grenades and the agility with which they moved. In every battle the Palestinians waged, all the way from the battle of Karameh in 1968 to the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1976, from the Israeli invasion of 1978 to the one that came four years later, the Ashbal played a major role. 

anonymous asked:

so you dont think armed conflict is what will solve the israel/palestine conflict? or rather, the palestinains shouldnt resist violently?

so hamas is the only group to ever engage israel in armed conflict? that leaves out like 4 decades of palestinian history, not to mention the entirety of the west bank’s history, but y'know, whatever.

on whether or not i support violent resistance by palestinians, i would say there’s never been an anticolonial liberation without violence but given that this is an ethnic conflict and attacking a guy in the idf quickly becomes attacking civilians i’m not convinced violent resistance is acceptable in an ethnic conflict

Gigi Hadid isn’t worth a damn

It’s incredibly pathetic to see the amount of worship she gets on this site because she happens to be half-Palestinian

For starters, she’s posed in full on blackface for Vogue magazine

When this is what she actually looks like

To add onto this, she’s also been praised for this photograph:

In which she is wearing a Chanel jacket ~inspired~ by the Palestinian keffiyeh, with Gigi herself being Palestinian.

Now for some reason, people seem far too dense to compute why this is shitty in the first place.

The Palestinian keffiyeh is a symbol of Palestinian culture and resistance, worn by Yassir Arafat wherever he went, and was previously made by Palestinian keffiyeh makers throughout Palestine. Following the intifada, Israel essentially forced many Palestinian keffiyeh makers out of business. 

Recently, the keffiyeh has become a fashion statement, with Chinese knock-offs being sold throughout the West and the rest of the world, and at retailers like Urban Outfitters. These knock-offs have flooded the world and further driven the last Palestinian keffiyeh makers into desperate conditions, no longer able to make a living manufacturing the most widely recognized symbol of Palestinian culture.

Chanel has taken the design of our keffiyeh, and further stripped it of all meaning and turned it into no more than a fashion statement.

Hadid’s wearing of this Chanel coat isn’t a sign of her ~adhering to her Palestinian roots~, but rather her promotion from a position of privilege of the appropriation of our culture as Palestinians

I also find it rather odd that so many Palestinians have chosen to worship her as a Palestinian icon of some sort~, given how she fits into your typical standards for Western beauty and is incredibly privileged and white-passing, while completely ignoring the numerous struggling Palestinians who could only dream of being in her position given our situation as Palestinians.

This isn’t to deny her being half-Palestinian, but THAT she is half-Palestinian shouldn’t suddenly absolve her of any of her shit to begin with, and that so many people are so quick to defend her is just downright pathetic and transparent

The injustice done to the Palestinians, the dispossession, the massacres, not only the loss of that part of Palestine which became Israel–and is internationally recognized as such–but also the occupation of the remainder of the Mandate territory and the bloody suppression of any and all manifestation of Palestinian resistance: all this had to take second place to Israel’s security and the civilized values and democracy for which Israel was widely promoted. Her army, which often behaved with cruelty and indiscipline, was to be regarded as an exemplar of “purity of arms” and those of us who witnessed Israel’s killing of civilians were to be abused as liars, anti-Semites or friends of “terrorism”…Report the wanton use of violence by Palestinians–aircraft hijackings, attacks on illegal Jewish settlements and then, inevitably, suicide bombings on the innocent, the executioner with explosives strapped to his or her body–and that was “terror” pure and simple, dangerously present but comfortably isolated from reason, cause or history.
—  Robert Fisk, The Great War for Civilization, Fifty Thousand Miles from Palestine
The feminism I relate to, the feminism I draw on, is the feminism of women resisting imperialism, exploitation, war and patriarchy – it is the feminism of Indian women fighting back against rape culture, Palestinian women resisting Israeli occupation, Bengali women demanding basic safety conditions in sweat factories producing clothes for fake fashion feministas – the innumerable women of the Arab uprisings and their ongoing resistance.
When I say feminism has been hijacked by white women, I mean white culture continues to dominate the narrative in all fields and renders alternative points of view as quaint contributions permitted to confirm the eternal truth of western supremacy.
—  Myriam Francois-Cerrah

Why wasn’t there an Arab oil embargo after the Six Day War?

Well, there was one, it just wasn’t very effective. The Gulf States and Libya weren’t interested in rewarding the radicals in Egypt and Syria with their oil revenues, and the radicals had little leverage. Their legitimacy depended on the Palestinians – and resistance to Israel – and the radicals couldn’t really claim the mantle of resistance when they had soundly lost the war, and with it the Territories.

So when the Egyptians and the Saudis got together in September 1967, the Egyptians agreed to call off the embargo in exchange for a commitment to Arab solidarity from the conservatives – no peace, no recognition, and no negotiation – and $378 million per year in aid from the conservatives to Egypt and Jordan. (Syria, which had absented itself from the conference, got nothing.) Egypt needed that aid more than they needed the embargo.

This package deal was attractive to the conservatives. They didn’t want Egypt to win – that might have made pressure for Arab unity under Nasser irresistible – but they also didn’t want Egypt’s loss to be their fault – because that would have made them traitors to the Arab cause.

M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, “The 1967 Oil Embargo Revisited,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 13:2 (1984): 69–70:

The 1956 experience had taught the conferees that,unless contained or absorbed, the spontaneous anger of the Arab world could prove destructive, and the situation in 1967 seemed ripe for a repetition, since for quite some time before the outbreak of hostilities Cairo and Damascus had been overtly urging the destruction of Western-owned installations in the event of any Western intervention and support of Israel. Similar urgings at the time of Suez had led directly to the sabotage of the IPC pipeline. Israeli victories on the battlefield inflamed the feelings of outrage among the Arab masses. The International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions called on all Arab oil states to join in the embargo. It also urged workers to blow up pipelines and oil installations in any Arab nation that refused to comply with the embargo.

Anti-American riots broke out in Saudi Arabia on June 7. In Bahrain, two refineries were shut down because of a labor stoppage. Anti-Western feelings were running high, mainly because the devastating victory which Israel achieved had been scored by using Western-supplied weapons. This explosive situation posed an intense political problem for the oil-producing governments, mainly Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, none of which had a secure grip on power. Under the circumstances, it seemed expedient for those countries to demonstrate true Arab sentiments by joining the embargo against Britain and the United States.

The conservatives would have preferred to see the whole Palestinian issue disappear. They wanted Soviet-American mediation and Israeli withdrawal from the Territories. They didn’t want the Palestinians lending credit to Arab nationalists and the Soviets.

Soviet intervention and Egyptian predominance might have choked off Western support and Western financing, which would have suited the Egyptians and Syrians just fine, but would have threatened the independence and credibility of the conservative states. 

Oil production made up 93% of Saudi government income. American companies had invested $1 billion in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s. Western markets bought Arab oil. And if Arab oil was cut out of Western markets, then – irony of ironies – Soviet oil would take its place. Why would Saudi Arabia ever agree to a blockade?

You have to remember that, at the time of the Six Day War, Egyptian soldiers were in Yemen, fighting a Saudi-backed monarchy. Egypt had already broken a 1965 ceasefire agreement, brokered by the Saudis. Why should the Saudis help the Egyptians under those circumstances? Why should they hurt themselves to help their rivals?

The conservatives were prepared to give the radicals some support – they had agreed to the embargo in May 1967, after all – but they didn’t want to pay for their own hangmen. Thankfully, the Egyptians decided to withdraw from Yemen in August 1967. That helped the Saudis come onside.

But the oil had to flow.

So what changed in 1973?

Well, there are a few things: Sadat, who became Egyptian president in 1970, was more amenable than Nasser had been. He had expelled the Soviet advisors. He wasn’t leading a revolution against the monarchies. He wasn’t even a pan-Arabists. 

And Egypt and Syria had tied themselves into OAPEC – before 1972, the conservatives had kept them out. That would help Arab producers set the production mandates needed to make any embargo effective. See the Wikipedia article on the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries:

On 9 January 1968, three of the then–most conservative Arab oil states Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia agreed at a conference in Beirut, Lebanon to found the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, aiming to separate the production and sale of oil from politics in the wake of the halfhearted 1967 oil embargo in response to the Six Day War. Such use of the economic weapon of oil embargo in the struggle against Israel had been regularly proposed at Arab Petroleum Congresses, but it took the Six Day War for the embargo to happen. However Saudi Arabia’s oil production was up by 9% that year, and the main embargo lasted only ten days and was completely ended by the Khartoum Conference.

OAPEC was originally intended to be a conservative Arab political organization which, by restricting membership to countries whose main export was oil, would exclude governments seen as radical such as Egypt and Algeria. This organizational exclusivity was bolstered by an additional rule in the organization’s charter requiring the three founders’ approval all new members. The original aim was to control the economic weapon of potential oil embargo and prevent its use caused by popular emotion. Iraq initially declined to join, preferring to work under the umbrella of the Arab League, considering OAPEC too conservative. Equally the three founders considered Iraq too radical to be desirable as a member. However, by early 1972, the criteria for admission changed to oil being a significant source, rather than the principal source of revenue of a prospective member nation and Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Egypt had been admitted. Consequently, the OAPEC became a much more activist organization, contrary to the original intention.

But the most important change was in the markets. 

Back in 1967, the Arab states produced 9.80 mbd, but there had been 1.58 mbd in excess daily production, while Cuban, Venezuelan, American, Canadian, and Far Eastern producers had 5 mbd of spare capacity. The Arab oil embargo would have needed to be exceptionally effective to pinch the West.

By early 1973, most of that spare capacity was gone. Western supply had become much more inelastic. Richard Nixon abolished oil import quotas in April 1973, affirming America’s increasing dependence on foreign supply – 6.2 mbd by the summer of 1973, from 4.5 mbd in 1972. There were no more wells that the Americans could turn online as the Arabs turned theirs off.

So when the oil embargo began in October 1973 – OPEC price hikes of 70%, rolling supply cutbacks of 5% each month, and a total embargo on all oil shipments to the United States – Arab supply dropped from 20.8 mbd to 15.8 mbd in a month. Other producers, including Iraq and Iran, increased production, but the net effect was still a reduction of 4.4 mbd. And when the entire world oil market amounted to only 50.8 mbd, and the Americans and their friends had almost no spare capacity, that really pinched.

Of course, under Sadat, the Egyptians eventually made peace with Israel, which made most of these issues moot.