a/n:this song!!! i’m in complete love. please support this hard working boy and give him the amount of appreciation he deserves ♡♡
(it’s a difference plot from the mv btw heh)
A typical Sunday morning during summer break was to wake up at 11AM due to the constant ringing of your phone from the buzzing text messages your best friend has been sending you. Trudging to the kitchen, you grab a box of cereal from the pantry, taking a ziplock bag and pouring some milk into it as you mix it with your cheerios. Cause that means no dishes, right?
You sit down to eat on the kitchen counter and finally check your phone to reply to your annoying best friend.
Based on a Soulmate AU where within a year of the younger half of a pairing turning 18, soulmates will switch bodies with one another. They have 24 hours in their soulmate’s life before being returned to their own. While in their soulmate’s body, a person is inhibited from mentioning their other life. They also cannot contact themselves in any way, however, people have figured out methods around this rule.
Warnings: Foul Language (Wonwoo), Inequality (S.Coups), Mentions of Death (Vernon)
-by Admin Bee
A/N: Welcome to the start of a brand new mini series I like to call: Seventeen Is Going To End Me. What started as a set of drabbles quickly spiraled into 1000+ word fanfiction. I’ll be posting each unit by week, and there is a part 2 for each fic that is either a switched perspective or a “Day After” story, but I will only be posting those based on how many notes Part 1 gets or if requested.
This got kinda long, and it’s dark in some spots (character death, violence, etc.), but for anyone wondering what happens in the reverse-Endangered storyline, I made up a full (and very rough draft of a) plot in one day. :y The below picks up from chapter ”negative zero-point-five,” because I am the best at naming things.
Upon completing my academic studies in the field of nuclear politics, I’d like to summarize the conclusions I’ve arrived to in regard to potential causes of a nuclear war.
If we were to look at the problem realistically, there are only 2 instances that can lead to this dramatic scenario. I’ll identify the two as the (1) passive cause and (2) active indirect cause.
Passive cause: A nuclear war or a tragic incident caused by the explosion of one or two nuclear warheads, that is unintentional. Nuclear weapons are in the possession and under control of military bureaucracies. The “normal accident theory” suggests that all bureaucracies by nature, no matter how liberal or authoritarian, are skewed towards making mistakes. It doesn’t matter how much money the state hurls into its nuclear arms budget, and it doesn’t matter how well disciplined are the officers, how well protected the facilities, and how well maintained and upgraded the nuclear arsenals - because, for as long as nuclear arms are managed by a bureaucracy (a chain of command), an accident will happen sooner or later. The incident may involve either a tragic series of technological failures, or human error (mismanagement, carelessness, misunderstanding of orders given by higher command), or both which will lead to an accident. It is a mathematical conclusion that this accident will sooner or later take place. And there has indeed been a large number of mistakes done on both sides of the Cold War, which luckily did not escalate into accidents. An accidental explosion or discharge of a nuclear weapon may not only lead to one tragic incident, but also trigger a series of incidents, as the military and civil bureaucracies in charge of dealing with and responding to nuclear crises can engage in further human error caused by panic, misinformation, misunderstanding.
Active indirect cause: A nuclear war caused by the attainment of nuclear superiority by one or more states. M.A.D. (mutually-assured destruction) implies that nuclear states are deterred from engaging in war against each other due to their understanding that any such war would be suicidal for the aggressor as well as the victim. This is due to the second-strike capability provided by the nuclear-triad. Nuclear state A cannot directly attack nuclear state B because A knows that it is impossible to block a retaliatory attack from B. Any such attack would lead to mutual destruction. However, the implementation of a successful Nuclear Strategy would grant state A the ability to neutralize and/or block most if not all of state B’s retaliatory potential, meaning that A could hypothetically use nuclear arms against another nuclear state without the fear of punishment. The successful implementation of a Nuclear Strategy would thus grant state A a first-strike capability, which by definition would make MAD irrelevant, and sow disorder and panic into the fragile balance of powers in the world. This consequentially would transform nuclear arms into potentially-conventional weapons, and have serious implications for the future of the nuclear standoff. In times of the Cold War, the first proposal for a Nuclear Strategy was embraced by Ronald Reagan’s administration. The program was dubbed SDI “Star Wars” and suggested the construction of space-based anti-missile defense systems which could neutralize ICBMs coming out of the USSR or other potential adversaries. Technologically, however, this was impossible to achieve and became more of a political weapon than a military one. However, today a similar attempt has been pioneered, primarily under Obama’s administration to build Anti-Missile Defense systems close to Russian and Chinese borders. The efficiency of these ABM systems is difficult to assess, but regardless of their potential to provide the US with a first-strike capability against Russia and China, their construction alone will have significant political consequences, signaling to Russia and China that nuclear arms are no longer identified by the US as solely “tools of peaceful deterrence”, causing them to overhaul their military doctrines, giving nuclear arms a potential limited role in conventional warfare.
There are many factors that can cause a nuclear war, but the most likely ones have been described above. When a state increases its budget aimed at increasing, upgrading or maintaining its nuclear arsenal, this should not be seen in a negative light. An increase in the nuclear budget can in fact reduce the chances of a nuclear accident or at least postpone it, because greater care and attention will be given to the arsenals, than otherwise if the budget would be cut. What is however dangerous, is the pursuit of defensive weapons aimed at deflecting or denying a nuclear attack, especially if those defensive weapons are placed close to the borders of a nuclear rival.
It is ultimately impossible to get rid of nukes for the following reasons:
(1) there is no physically-possible way of ensuring the destruction of nuclear arsenals. If state A and state B sign a disarmament agreement, state A has no assured means of trusting state B to destroy its arsenal. Hence, state A will not risk leaving itself defenseless, if state B had potentially decided to play a double-game and hid some of its warheads in secret facilities. Thus any such agreements on complete disarmament will always start and end on paper, and have little to no progress physically.
(2) the physical destruction of nuclear arms does not ensure the prevention of a nuclear war. Because the knowledge of creating nuclear weapons will forever remain within humanity’s memory. As history progresses, borders will change, ideologies will change, countries will change, leaderships will change, and eventually we will once again arrive at possessing nuclear arsenals.
Thus, humanity had signed its own death certificate the moment it had technologically evolved to the point of creating nuclear weapons. From this point onward, we can rely
on Automatic Deterrence*, Institutional Deterrence**, or Recessed Deterrence***, to avert a nuclear war, but we cannot completely eliminate nuclear weapons from our present or future history.
*Automatic Deterrence - the belief that the human instinct of self-presentation of own species will always deter humans from using nuclear weapons even against their enemies. **
Institutional Deterrence - the belief that preventing the use of nuclear weapons necessitates international cooperation, treaties, inspection agencies and regulation, as well as reform and betterment of bureaucracies in control of the nuclear arsenals. ***
Recessed Deterrence - the belief that we can physically eliminate all nuclear weapons, but give states’ security assurance that they can quickly rebuild their nuclear arsenals in case of dire need or conflict.
On the evening of February 12, 2009, a Continental Connection commuter flight made its way through blustery weather between Newark, New Jersey, and Buffalo, New York. As is typical of commercial flights today, the pilots didn’t have all that much to do during the hour-long trip. The captain, Marvin Renslow, manned the controls briefly during takeoff, guiding the Bombardier Q400 turboprop into the air, then switched on the autopilot and let the software do the flying. He and his co-pilot, Rebecca Shaw, chatted—about their families, their careers, the personalities of air-traffic controllers—as the plane cruised uneventfully along its northwesterly route at 16,000 feet. The Q400 was well into its approach to the Buffalo airport, its landing gear down, its wing flaps out, when the pilot’s control yoke began to shudder noisily, a signal that the plane was losing lift and risked going into an aerodynamic stall. The autopilot disconnected, and the captain took over the controls. He reacted quickly, but he did precisely the wrong thing: he jerked back on the yoke, lifting the plane’s nose and reducing its airspeed, instead of pushing the yoke forward to gain velocity. Rather than preventing a stall, Renslow’s action caused one. The plane spun out of control, then plummeted. “We’re down,” the captain said, just before the Q400 slammed into a house in a Buffalo suburb.
The crash, which killed all 49 people on board as well as one person on the ground, should never have happened. A National Transportation Safety Board investigation concluded that the cause of the accident was pilot error. The captain’s response to the stall warning, the investigators reported, “should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his training” and instead revealed “startle and confusion.” An executive from the company that operated the flight, the regional carrier Colgan Air, admitted that the pilots seemed to lack “situational awareness” as the emergency unfolded.
The Buffalo crash was not an isolated incident. An eerily similar disaster, with far more casualties, occurred a few months later. On the night of May 31, an Air France Airbus A330 took off from Rio de Janeiro, bound for Paris. The jumbo jet ran into a storm over the Atlantic about three hours after takeoff. Its air-speed sensors, coated with ice, began giving faulty readings, causing the autopilot to disengage. Bewildered, the pilot flying the plane, Pierre-Cédric Bonin, yanked back on the stick. The plane rose and a stall warning sounded, but he continued to pull back heedlessly. As the plane climbed sharply, it lost velocity. The airspeed sensors began working again, providing the crew with accurate numbers. Yet Bonin continued to slow the plane. The jet stalled and began to fall. If he had simply let go of the control, the A330 would likely have righted itself. But he didn’t. The plane dropped 35,000 feet in three minutes before hitting the ocean. All 228 passengers and crew members died.