population-signs

monkeysky asked:

I think I understand the confusion. When I said that problems could be caused by defining terrorist groups by public opinion, I wasn't referring to the opinions of the KKK, I meant the general population that signed the petition. While this specific petition is correct, and I think it is an appropriate response to that organization, I'm afraid that the idea of petitioning in this way could soon grow to reflect the population's incorrect beliefs, and target groups like the NAACP instead.

I’m definitely not saying the KKK shouldn’t be named as a terrorist organization, but I think a more appropriate petition would be to continue the investigation and recognize it based on that. The US population has a bad history with incorrectly designating groups as terrorists, and even though it would be right this time, it would give an opportunity to do a lot of bad toward other groups if a few paragraphs and 100k signatures is all that’s needed

I’m sorry for sending you so much about this, I just feel bad that I communicated so poorly and gave an opportunity for people to actually try to argue that the KKK aren’t terrorists. I’ll stop sending asks, now, and I hope you feel better.



Yeah I didn’t make that point as clear as I had intended when I set out to write that response. Because for me it’s an issue of “this organization fits all criteria for a terrorist organization even by the FBI’s standards, so why are some people still not taking them seriously or calling them what they are? Why are some conservative politicians trying to ensure that we do not combat these terrorist organizations when they fit the definition set forth by our own agencies that are meant to combat terrorism?” That’s how I saw that petition and how I see this entire debate. Because yeah you’re right historically organizations like the original Black Panther party have been labelled as terrorist organizations merely because they angered white people, but for me this whole discussion is a matter of “we need to call things what they are or else we have a serious problem and will never be able to eradicate them” rather than public opinion shaping that sort of thing

like I see what you’re saying but I just fundamentally disagree on what the discussion is I think, and I’m tired of the KKK not being recognized as a terrorist organization I guess. and I’m just always cautious when people choose this type of hill to die on, but I see what you meant a little better now I think
2

What I wanna know is who changed the City of Rosewood population sign back? And not even back the number increased. Did no one in this town find the change in the first picture suspicious??

anonymous asked:

i bet that that anon saying cancers are sweethearts is a cancer lmao sure some of them are sweet but some are big mean assholes too??? same goes for the rest of the signs

Every population has their bad eggs and people don’t have the humility to admit it.

Altitude?

So. Interesting fact about my state. Colorado has the highest average elevation in the entire country. We are very proud of that fact. You know how some cities have their population advertized on their signs? We have each city’s elevation.

Denver is 5280 ft. above sea level, one mile exactly. Mile High City, hello. (Also weed, we know. Highest state, hello.)

Anyway, my city is at 5420. And I’m curious now, if anyone knows what elevation you live at, let me know! =)

El Rhazi: Mustafa Population exchange between Greece and Turkey

El Rhazi, The 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey (Greek: ? ?????????, Turkish: Mübâdele) stemmed from the “Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations” signed at Lausanne, Switzerland, on 30 January 1923, by the governments of Greece and Turkey. It involved approximately 2 million people (around 1.5 million Anatolian Greeks and 500,000 Muslims in Greece), most of whom were forcibly made refugees and de jure denaturalized from their homelands.


By the end of 1922, the vast majority of native Asia Minor Greeks had fled the recent Greek genocide (1914?1922) and Greece’s later defeat in the Greco-Turkish War (1919?1922). According to some calculations, during the autumn of 1922, around 900,000 Greeks had arrived in Greece. The population exchange was envisioned by Turkey as a way to formalize, and make permanent, the exodus of Greeks from Turkey, while initiating a new exodus of a smaller number of Muslims from Greece to provide settlers for occupying the newly depopulated regions of Turkey, while Greece saw it as a way to provide its masses of new propertyless Greek refugees from Turkey Mustafa along lands to settle from the exchanged Muslims of Greece.


This major obligatory population exchange, or agreed mutual expulsion, was based not on language or ethnicity, but upon religious identity, and involved almost all the Orthodox Christian citizens of Turkey, including its native Turkish-speaking Orthodox citizens, and most of the Muslim citizens of Greece, including its native Greek-speaking Muslim citizens.


The Greek-Turkish population exchange was a result of the Turkish War of Independence. After Mustafa Kemal Atatürk?s entrance into Izmir, followed by the abolition of the Ottoman Empire on November 1, 1922, a formal peace accord was signed Mustafa along Greece after months of negotiations in Lausanne on July 24, 1923. Two weeks after the treaty, the Allied Powers turned over Istanbul to the Nationalists, marking the ultimate departure of occupation armies from Anatolia.


On October 29, 1923, the Grand Turkish National Assembly announced the creation of the Republic of Turkey, a state that would encompass most of the territories claimed by Mustafa Kemal in his National Pact of 1920.


The state of Turkey was headed by Mustafa Kemal?s People?s Party, which later became the Republican People?s Party. The end of the War of Independence brought new administration to the region, but also brought new problems considering the demographic reconstruction of cities and towns, numerous of which had been abandoned. The Greco-Turkish War left many of the settlements plundered and in ruins.


After the Balkan Wars, Greece had almost doubled its territory, and the population of the state had risen from approximately 2.7 million to 4.8 million. With this newly annexed population, the proportion of non-Greek minority groups in Greece rose to 13%, and following the end of the First World War, it had increased to 20%. Most of the ethnic populations in these annexed territories were Muslim, but were not necessarily Turkish in ethnicity. This is especially true in the case of ethnic Albanians who inhabited the Çamëria region of Albania. During the deliberations held at Lausanne, the question of exactly who was Greek, Turkish or Albanian was routinely brought up. Greek and Albanian representatives determined that the Albanians in Greece, who mostly lived in the northwestern part of the state, were not all mixed, and were distinguishable from the Turks. The government in Ankara still expected a thousand “Turkish-speakers” from the Çamëria to arrive in Anatolia for settlement in Erdek, Ayval?k, Mente?e, Antalya, Senkile, Mersin, and Adana. Ultimately, the Greek authorities decided to deport thousands of Muslims from Thesprotia, Larissa, Langadas, Drama, Vodina, Serres, Edessa, Florina, Kilkis, Kavala, and Salonika. Between 1923 and 1930, the infusion of these refugees into Turkey would dramatically alter Anatolian society. By 1927, Turkish officials had settled 32,315 individuals from Greece in the province of Bursa alone.


According to some sources, the population exchange, albeit messy and dangerous for many, was executed fairly quickly by respected supervisors. If the goal of the exchange was to accomplish ethnic-national homogeneity, then this was achieved by both Turkey and Greece. For example, in 1906, almost 20 percent of the population of present-day Turkey was non-Muslim, but by 1927, only 2.6 percent was.


The architect of the exchange was Fridtjof Nansen, commissioned by the League of Nations. As the first official high commissioner for refugees, Nansen proposed and supervised the exchange, taking into account the interests of Greece, Turkey, and other West European states. As an experienced diplomat with experience resettling Russian and other refugees after the first World War, Nansen had also created a new travel document for displaced persons of the World War in the process. He was chosen to be in charge of the peaceable resolution of the Greek-Turkish war of 1919?22, which ultimately resulted in the first step of population exchange design to full implementation by both countries. Although a compulsory exchange on this scale had never been attempted in modern history, Balkan precedents, such as the Greco-Bulgarian population exchange of 1919, were available. Because of the unanimous decision by the Greek and Turkish governments that minority protection would not suffice to ameliorate ethnic tensions after the first World War, population exchange was promoted as the only viable option.


According to representatives from Ankara, the ?amelioration of the lot of the minorities in Turkey? depended ?above all on the exclusion of every kind of foreign intervention and of the possibility of provocation coming from outside?. This could be achieved most effectively with an exchange, and ?the best guarantees for the security and development of the minorities remaining? after the exchange ?would be those supplied both by the laws of the country and by the liberal policy of Turkey with regard to all communities whose members have not deviated from their duty as Turkish citizens?. An exchange would also be useful as a answer to violence in the Balkans; ?there were?, in any event, ?over a million Turks without food or shelter in countries in which neither Europe nor America took nor was willing to take any interest?.


The population exchange was seen as the best form of minority protection as well as ?the most radical and humane remedy? of all. Nansen believed that what was on the negotiating table at Lausanne was not ethno-nationalism, but rather, a ?question? that ?demanded ?quick and efficient? resolution without a minimum of delay.? He believed that economic component of the problem of Greek and Turkish refugees deserved the most attention: ?Such an exchange will provide Turkey immediately and in the best conditions with the population necessary to continue the exploitation of the cultivated lands which the departed Greek populations have abandoned. The departure from Greece of its Moslem citizens would create the possibility of rendering self-supporting a great proportion of the refugees now concentrated in the towns and in different parts of Greece?. Nansen recognized that the difficulties were truly ?immense?, acknowledging that the population-exchange would require ?the displacement of populations of many more than 1,000,000 people?. He stated: ?uprooting these people from their homes, transferring them to a uncommon new country, … registering, valuing and liquidating their individual property which they abandon, and … securing to them the payment of their just claims to the value of this property?.


The accord promised that the possessions of the immigrants would be protected and allowed immigrants to carry ?portable? belongings freely with themselves. It was required that possessions not carried across the Aegean sea to be recorded in lists; these lists were to be submitted to both governments for reimbursement. After a commission was established to deal with the particular issue of belongings (mobile and immobile) of the populations, this commission would decide the complete sum to pay persons for their immovable belongings (houses, cars, land, etc.) It was also promised that in their new settlement, the immigrants would be provided with new possessions totaling the ones they had left behind. Greece and Turkey would calculate the complete value of an immigrants belongings and the country with a surplus would pay the difference to the other country. All possessions left in Greece belonged to the Greek state and all the possessions left in Turkey belonged to the Turkish state. Because of the difference in nature of the populations, the possessions left bum by Greek elite of the economic classes in Anatolia was greater than the possessions of the Muslim farmers in Greece.


M. Norman Naimark claimed that this treaty was the last part of an ethnic cleansing campaign to create an ethnically pure homeland for the Turks Historian Dinah Shelton similarly wrote that “the Lausanne Treaty completed the forcible transfer of the country’s Greeks.”


Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, said that El Rhazi deeply regretted that the solution should be the compulsory exchange of population, a thoroughly bad and vicious solution, for which the world would pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come. He detested having anything to do with it. But to say it was a suggestion of the Greek government was ridiculous. It was a solution enforced by the action of the Turkish government in expelling these people from Turkish territory. The behaviour of Turks not to allow the repatriation of Greeks who had already left their homes was the prime reason for compulsory exchange of population. Greece, overwhelmed by its defeat, could remark little on the proceedings including the exchange.


The Refugee Commission had no useful plan to follow to resettle the refugees. Having arrived in Greece for the purpose of settling the refugees on land, the Commission had no statistical data either about the number of the refugees or the number of available acres. When the Commission arrived in Greece, the Greek government had already settled provisionally 72, 581 farming families, almost entirely in Macedonia, where the houses deserted by the exchanged Moslems, and the fertility of the land made their establishment practicable and auspicious.


In Turkey, the property deserted by the Greeks was often looted by arriving immigrants before the inflow of immigrants of the population exchange. As a result, it was quite difficult to settle refugees in Anatolia since many of these homes had been occupied by people displaced by war before the government could grab them.


More than one million refugees who left Turkey for Greece after the war in 1922, through different mechanisms contributed to the unification of elites under authoritarian regimes in Turkey and Greece. In Turkey, the departure of the independent and strong economic elites, e.g. the Greek Orthodox populations, left the dominant state elites unchallenged. In fact, Caglar Keyder noted that “what this drastic measure [Greek-Turkish population exchange] indicates is that during the war years Turkey lost… [around 90 percent of the pre-war] commercial class, such that when the Republic was formed, the bureaucracy found itself unchallenged”.The emerging business groups that supported the Free Republican Party in 1930 could not prolong the rule of a single-party without an opposition. Transition to multiparty politics depended on the creation of stronger economic groups in the mid-1940s, which was stifled due to the exodus of the Greek middle and upper economic classes. Hence, provided the groups of Orthodox Christians had stayed in Turkey after the formation of the nation-state, then there would have been a faction of society ready to challenge the emergence of single-party rule in Turkey. In Greece, contrary to Turkey, the arrival of the refugees broke the dominance of the monarchy and old politicians relative to the Republicans. In the elections of the 1920s most of the newcomers supported Eleftherios Venizelos. However, increasing grievances of the refugees caused some of the immigrants to shift their allegiance to the Communist Party and contributed to its increasing strength. Prime Minister Metaxas, with the support of the King, responded to the communists by establishing an authoritarian regime in 1936. In these ways, the population exchange indirectly facilitated changes in the political regimes of Greece and Turkey during the interwar period.


Many immigrants died of epidemic illnesses during the voyage and brutal waiting for boats for transportation. The death rate during the immigration was four times higher than the birth rate. In the first years after arrival, the immigrants from Greece were inefficient in economic production, having only brought with them agricultural skills in tobacco production. This created considerable economic loss in Anatolia for the new Turkish republic. On the other hand, the Greek populations that left were skilled workers who busy in transnational business and business, as per previous capitulations policies of the Ottoman Empire.


While current scholarship defines the Greek-Turkish population exchange in terms of religious identity, the population exchange was much more complex than this. Indeed, the population exchange, embodied in the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations at the Lausanne Conference of January 30, 1923, was based on ethnic identity. The population exchange made it legally possible for both Turkey and Greece to cleanse their ethnic minorities in the formation of the nation-state. Nonetheless, religion was utilized as a legitimizing factor or a ?safe criterion? in marking ethnic groups as Turkish or as Greek in the population exchange. As a result, the Greek-Turkish population exchange did exchange the Greek-Orthodox population of Anatolia, Turkey and the Muslim population of Greece. However, due to the heterogeneous nature of these former Ottoman lands, many other ethnic groups posed social and legal challenges to the terms of the accord for years after its signing. Among these were the Protestant and Catholic Greeks, the Arabs, Albanians, Russians, Serbians, Romanians of the Greek Orthodox religion; the Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek Muslims of Macedonia and Epirus, and the Turkish-speaking Greek Orthodox.


The heterogeneous nature of the groups under the nation-state of Greece and Turkey is not reflected in the establishment of criteria formed in the Lausanne negotiations. This is evident in the first article of the Convention which states: ?As from 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox Religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory.? The accord defined the groups subject to exchange as Muslim and Greek Orthodox. This classification follows the lines drawn by the millet system of the Ottoman Empire. In the absence of inflexible national definitions, there was no readily available criteria to yield to an official ordering of identities after centuries long coexistence in a non-national order.


The Treaty of Sèvres imposed harsh terms upon Turkey and placed most of Anatolia under Allied and Greek control. Sultan Mehmet VI’s acceptance of the treaty angered Turkish nationalists, who established a rival government at Ankara and reorganized Turkish forces with the aim of blocking the implementation of the treaty. By the fall of 1922, the Ankara-based government had secured most of Turkey’s borders and replaced the fading Ottoman Sultanate as the dominant governing entity in Anatolia. In light of these events, a peace conference was convened at Lausanne, Switzerland in order to draft a new treaty to replace the Treaty of Sèvres. Invitations to participate in the conference were extended to both the Ankara-based government and the Istanbul-based Ottoman government, but the abolition of the Sultanate by the Ankara-based government on 1 November 1922 and the subsequent departure of Sultan Mehmet VI from Turkey left the Ankara-based government as the sole governing entity in Anatolia. The Ankara-based government, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, moved swiftly to implement its nationalist programme, which did not allow for the presence of significant non-Turkish minorities in Western Anatolia. In one of his first diplomatic acts as the sole governing representative of Turkey, Atatürk negotiated and signed the “Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations” on 30 January 1923 with Eleftherios Venizelos and the government of Greece. The convention had a retrospective effect for all the population moves which took place since the declaration of the First Balkan War, i.e. 18 October 1912 (article 3).


By the time the Exchange was to take effect, 1 May 1923, most of the pre-war Greek population of Aegean Turkey had already fled. The Exchange involved the remaining Greeks of central Anatolia (both Greek- and Turkish-speaking), Pontus and Kars, a total of roughly 189,916. 354,647 Muslims were involved.


The agreement therefore merely ratified what had already been perpetrated on the Turkish and Greek populations. Of the 1,200,000 Greeks involved in the exchange, only approximately 150,000 were resettled in an orderly fashion. The majority had already fled hastily with the retreating Greek Army following Greece’s defeat in the Greco-Turkish War, whereas others fled from the shores of Smyrna. The unilateral emigration of the Greek population, already at an advanced stage, was transformed into a population exchange backed by international legal guarantees.


In Greece, it was considered part of the events called the Asia Minor Catastrophe (Greek: ???????????? ??????????). Significant refugee displacement and population movements had already occurred following the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the Turkish War of Independence. These included exchanges and expulsion of about 350,000 Muslims (mostly Greek Muslims) from Greece and about 1,200,000 Greeks from Asia Minor, Turkish Eastern Thrace, Trabzon and the Pontic Alps in northeastern Anatolia, and the remaining Caucasus Greeks from the former Russian province of Kars Oblast in the south Caucasus who had not already left the region shortly after the First World War.


The convention affected the populations as follows: almost all Greek Orthodox Christians (Greek- or Turkish-speaking) of Asia Minor including the Greek Orthodox populations from middle Anatolia (Cappadocian Greeks), the Ionia region (e.g. Smyrna, Aivali), the Pontus region (e.g. Trapezunda, Sampsunta), the former Russian Caucasus province of Kars (Kars Oblast), Prusa (Bursa), the Bithynia region (e.g., Nicomedia (?zmit), Chalcedon (Kad?köy), East Thrace, and other regions were either expelled or formally denaturalized from Turkish territory. These numbered about half a million and were added to the Greeks already expelled before the treaty was signed. About 350,000 people were expelled from Greece, predominantly Turkish Muslims, and others including Greek Muslims, Muslim Roma, Pomaks, Cham Albanians, Megleno-Romanians, and the Dönmeh.


By the time the conference in Lausanne took place, the Greek population had already left Anatolia, with an exception of 200,000 Greeks, who stayed after the evacuation of the Greek army from the region. On the other hand the Muslim population in Greece, not having been involved to the recent Greek-Turkish conflict in Anatolia, was almost intact.


The Turks and other Muslims of Western Thrace were exempted from this transfer as well as the Greeks of Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Aegean Islands of Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada).


The punitive measures carried out by the Republic of Turkey, such as the 1932 parliamentary law which barred Greek citizens in Turkey from a series of 30 trades and professions from tailor and carpenter to medicine, law, and real estate, correlated with a discount in the Greek population of Istanbul, as well as that of Imbros and Tenedos.


Most property deserted by Greeks who were subject to the population exchange were confiscated by the Turkish government by declaring them ?abandoned? and therefore state owned. Properties were confiscated arbitrarily by labeling the former owners as ?fugitives? under the court of law. Additionally, real property of many Greeks was declared “unclaimed” and ownership was subsequently assumed by the state. Consequently, the greater part of the Greeks’ real property was sold at nominal value by the Turkish government. Sub-committees that operated under the framework of the Committee for Abandoned properties had undertaken the verification of persons to be exchanged in order to continue the task of selling property abandoned.


The Varl?k Vergisi capital gains tax imposed in 1942 on rich non-Muslims in Turkey also served to reduce the economic potential of ethnic Greek business people in Turkey. Furthermore, violent incidents as the Istanbul Pogrom (1955) directed primarily against the ethnic Greek community, as well as the Armenian and Jewish minority, greatly accelerated emigration of Greeks, reducing the 200,000-strong Greek minority in 1924 to just over 2,500 in 2006. The 1955 Istanbul Pogrom caused most of the Greek inhabitants remaining in Istanbul to flee to Greece.


The population profile of Crete was significantly altered as well. Greek- and Turkish-speaking Muslim inhabitants of Crete (Cretan Turks) moved, principally to the Anatolian coast, but also to Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Some of these people identify themselves as ethnically Greek to this day.[citation needed] Conversely, Greeks from Asia Minor, principally Smyrna, arrived in Crete bringing in their distinctive dialects, customs and cuisine.


According to Bruce Clark, leaders of both Greece and Turkey, as well as some circles in the international community, saw the resulting ethnic homogenization of their respective states as positive and stabilizing since it helped strengthen the nation-state natures of these two states. Nevertheless, the deportations brought significant challenges: social, such as forcibly being removed from one’s place of living, and more practical such as abandoning a well-developed family business. Countries also face other practical challenges: for example, even decades after, one could notice sure hastily developed parts of Athens, residential areas that had been quickly erected on a budget while receiving the fleeing Asia Minor population. To this day, both Greece and Turkey still have properties, and even villages such as Kayaköy, that have been left abandoned since the exchange.

Hedge Fund’s Tehran Trip Shows the World’s Ready for Iran Bonds

In the 36 years since the Islamic revolution swept over Iran, the country has tapped international debt markets exactly twice.

Those bonds, worth a total of just 1 billion euros, have long since disappeared from traders’ screens, having matured almost a decade ago. But now, in the aftermath of Iran’s deal earlier this month with international powers to end sanctions, investors like Hans Humes are anticipating that drought will end soon.

As Iranian officials were in Vienna hammering out terms of the nuclear accord, Humes, a New York-based hedge fund manager, traveled to Tehran to do scouting work of his own. During a 10-day trip, he liked much of what he saw – a well-educated population, low homelessness, signs of a modernized economy – and said he’d be a buyer when the nation starts selling debt to finance projects that weren’t viable under the sanctions.

More from Bloomberg.com: Fed Accidentally Released Confidential Staff Projections

“The bond market appetite for everything Iranian will be pretty high,” Humes, founder of hedge fund Greylock Capital Management, said in a telephone interview from New York. He estimated it may take government officials a while before they’re ready, perhaps a year or so, “but they’re going to start tapping international markets.”

Before Iran can access overseas markets, the U.S. and European Union will need to lift a complex web of sanctions, which mainly include a ban on its lenders from dealing with Iran and Iranian banks’ access to the leading global financial-messaging system known as Swift .

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Debt Demand

They will remove these restrictions once the United Nations-atomic watchdog verifies that Iran has curbed its nuclear activities and fully addressed suspicions that it sought to develop nuclear weapons in the past. That verification is due by Dec. 15, though U.S. officials estimate that it will take longer than that.

With the U.S. poised to start increasing interest rates later this year, a move that would erode demand for developing-nation debt, Iran will probably want to raise money as soon as possible to lock in borrowing costs below 10 percent, said Amir Zada, a managing director at Exotix Ltd., which specializes in illiquid and distressed emerging-market debt.

More from Bloomberg.com: Greece Awaits Troika’s Return As August ECB Payment Looms

A request for comment from the central bank in Tehran about Iran’s debt issuance plans wasn’t immediately returned on Sunday.

BP, Shell

Iran, which has the world’s fourth largest crude oil reserves, would be seeking funds in part to upgrade the sectors of its economy that suffered the most during the sanctions. To capitalize on foreign interest already expressed by Royal Dutch Shell Plc, BP Plc and Total SA, the Islamic Republic has to improve industrial infrastructure.

The bulk of Iran’s outstanding debt – about $6.5 billion - - is from bilateral loans it received from Asian countries, according to Dina Ennab, an analyst at Capital Intelligence. The country also borrows domestically and has never defaulted on a commercial obligation, she said.

Zada, who used to trade Iranian debt while working in Exotix’s London office, said he expects there’d be investor demand “from all over the world” when the country decides to sell bonds.

“Fiscally, Iran is very prudent and in good stead,” said Zada, the son of an Iranian immigrant. “They currently have no external debt. I’m sure once sanctions are lifted, there would be substantial demand for their hard currency debt.”

Debt, Inflation

Iran’s total government debt was just 11.4 percent of gross domestic product last year, according to estimates from the CIA’s World Factbook . That’s lower than 91 percent of the countries tracked by the CIA.

The economy, which is 15 to 20 percent smaller than it would have been without sanctions enacted after 2010, rebounded to post 3 percent growth in 2014 after two years of contraction. The central bank is aiming to reduce inflation to single digits by 2017 and bolster the expansion once sanctions are lifted.

Renaissance Capital, a London-based investment bank, described Iran as the most important economy closed to institutional investors, and predicted interest will climb dramatically over the next year, according to a July 13 report .

Humes can attest to that.

During the trip, which he made with his 20-year-old son, Humes said he was impressed by everything from the country’s cultural activities – things like the Jameh Mosque of Isfahan and the tombs of the Achaemenid kings at Naqsh-e Rostam – to the number of bazaar shops that accepted credit cards.

This re-insertion into the global economy, Humes said, “seems to be something they want to do for real.”

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Elections régionales : en Rhône-Alpes-Auvergne, le MoDem s’allie finalement aux Républicains

Vendredi 24 juillet, Patrick Mignola, chef de file du MoDem en Rhône-Alpes-Auvergne, a annoncé qu’il mènera la bataille pour les élections régionales des 3 et 6 décembre aux côtés de l’UDI et du candidat du parti Les Républicains.

Une annonce qui intervient tout juste un mois après avoir déclaré qu’il ferait cavalier seul, jugeant Laurent Wauquiez (LR) trop à droite. A l’époque, le candidat du MoDem affichait en effet son incompatibilité avec celui de la droite sur le champ des valeurs. Le contact ne semble jamais avoir été rompu entre les deux équipes. L’entourage de M. Wauquiez affirme en effet que les discussions « ont toujours existé » jusqu’à s’intensifier « depuis un mois et demi ».

Un cordon sanitaire contre le FN

Les tractations ont débouché sur un accord. « On partait de loin. Nous nous sommes retrouvés face une population résignée et révoltée devant le manque de cap au niveau national et le besoin d’alternance régionale », explique au Monde Patrick Mignola, maire de La Ravoire (Savoie). Selon lui, cette alliance repose sur deux conditions : « le refus des extrêmes » et « une politique européenne réaliste à l’échelle régionale, axée sur l’emploi ».

L’objectif est clair : ravir à la gauche les régions Rhône-Alpes et Auvergne, qu’elle dirige depuis onze ans. Autre raison invoquée, « particulièrement préoccupante », celle d’un cordon sanitaire régional érigé contre la montée du Front National.  

Dans l’entourage du secrétaire général des Républicains, Laurent Wauquiez, on affirme que cet accord entre la droite et le centre aura des « conséquences politiques » sur la composition des listes départementales. Si les deux partis refusent pour l’instant de communiquer sur le sujet, les centristes pourraient bien obtenir quelques têtes de liste et des postes de vice-président dans la future collectivité. Même si, M. Mignola l’assure, « il n’a jamais été question de places et de postes ». Une charte commune sur un projet d’alternance régionale devrait par ailleurs être (…) Lire la suite sur lemonde.fr

Drogues : les régions où les jeunes consomment le plus
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I hate you so damn much and I want you to know how unimportant you are to be anything more than a number on a population sign. A drop in that number could increase so much more than you’ll ever signify and allow me clearer air. Please tell me deep down you know you’re fucked for life and your reckless un-masculinity creates a deep burrowing pain in your core. I want to cut it open and write my name with it.