Early last August, an envelope with extraordinary handling restrictions arrived at the White House. Sent by courier from the CIA, it carried “eyes only” instructions that its contents be shown to just four people: President Barack Obama and three senior aides.
Inside was an intelligence bombshell, a report drawn from sourcing deep inside the Russian government that detailed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s direct involvement in a cyber campaign to disrupt and discredit the U.S. presidential race.
But it went further. The intelligence captured Putin’s specific instructions on the operation’s audacious objectives — defeat or at least damage the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, and help elect her opponent, Donald Trump.
At that point, the outlines of the Russian assault on the U.S. election were increasingly apparent. Hackers with ties to Russian intelligence services had been rummaging through Democratic Party computer networks, as well as some Republican systems, for more than a year. In July, the FBI had opened an investigation of contacts between Russian officials and Trump associates. And on July 22, nearly 20,000 emails stolen from the Democratic National Committee were dumped online by WikiLeaks.
But at the highest levels of government, among those responsible for managing the crisis, the first moment of true foreboding about Russia’s intentions arrived with that CIA intelligence.
The material was so sensitive that CIA Director John Brennan kept it out of the President’s Daily Brief, concerned that even that restricted report’s distribution was too broad. The CIA package came with instructions that it be returned immediately after it was read. To guard against leaks, subsequent meetings in the Situation Room followed the same protocols as planning sessions for the Osama bin Laden raid.
It took time for other parts of the intelligence community to endorse the CIA’s view. Only in the administration’s final weeks in office did it tell the public, in a declassified report, what officials had learned from Brennan in August — that Putin was working to elect Trump.
[Putin ‘ordered’ effort to undermine faith in U.S. election and help Trump, report says]
Over that five-month interval, the Obama administration secretly debated dozens of options for deterring or punishing Russia, including cyberattacks on Russian infrastructure, the release of CIA-gathered material that might embarrass Putin and sanctions that officials said could “crater” the Russian economy.
But in the end, in late December, Obama approved a modest package combining measures that had been drawn up to punish Russia for other issues — expulsions of 35 diplomats and the closure of two Russian compounds — with economic sanctions so narrowly targeted that even those who helped design them describe their impact as largely symbolic.
Obama also approved a previously undisclosed covert measure that authorized planting cyber weapons in Russia’s infrastructure, the digital equivalent of bombs that could be detonated if the United States found itself in an escalating exchange with Moscow. The project, which Obama approved in a covert-action finding, was still in its planning stages when Obama left office. It would be up to President Trump to decide whether to use the capability.
In political terms, Russia’s interference was the crime of the century, an unprecedented and largely successful destabilizing attack on American democracy. It was a case that took almost no time to solve, traced to the Kremlin through cyber-forensics and intelligence on Putin’s involvement. And yet, because of the divergent ways Obama and Trump have handled the matter, Moscow appears unlikely to face proportionate consequences.
Those closest to Obama defend the administration’s response to Russia’s meddling. They note that by August it was too late to prevent the transfer to WikiLeaks and other groups of the troves of emails that would spill out in the ensuing months. They believe that a series of warnings — including one that Obama delivered to Putin in September — prompted Moscow to abandon any plans of further aggression, such as sabotage of U.S. voting systems.
Denis McDonough, who served as Obama’s chief of staff, said that the administration regarded Russia’s interference as an attack on the “heart of our system.”
“We set out from a first-order principle that required us to defend the integrity of the vote,” McDonough said in an interview. “Importantly, we did that. It’s also important to establish what happened and what they attempted to do so as to ensure that we take the steps necessary to stop it from happening again.”
But other administration officials look back on the Russia period with remorse.
“It is the hardest thing about my entire time in government to defend,” said a former senior Obama administration official involved in White House deliberations on Russia. “I feel like we sort of choked.”
The post-election period has been dominated by the overlapping investigations into whether Trump associates colluded with Russia before the election and whether the president sought to obstruct the FBI probe afterward. That spectacle has obscured the magnitude of Moscow’s attempt to hijack a precious and now vulnerable-seeming American democratic process.
Beset by allegations of hidden ties between his campaign and Russia, Trump has shown no inclination to revisit the matter and has denied any collusion or obstruction on his part. As a result, the expulsions and modest sanctions announced by Obama on Dec. 29 continue to stand as the United States’ most forceful response.
“The punishment did not fit the crime,” said Michael McFaul, who served as U.S. ambassador to Russia for the Obama administration from 2012 to 2014. “Russia violated our sovereignty, meddling in one of our most sacred acts as a democracy — electing our president. The Kremlin should have paid a much higher price for that attack. And U.S. policymakers now — both in the White House and Congress — should consider new actions to deter future Russian interventions.”
The Senate this month passed a bill that would impose additional election- and Ukraine-related sanctions on Moscow and limit Trump’s ability to lift them. The measure requires House approval, however, and Trump’s signature.
This account of the Obama administration’s response to Russia’s interference is based on interviews with more than three dozen current and former U.S. officials in senior positions in government, including at the White House, the State, Defense and Homeland Security departments, and U.S. intelligence services. Most agreed to speak only on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitivity of the issue.
The White House, the CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.
The secrecy extended into the White House.
Susan Rice, Avril Haines and White House homeland-security adviser Lisa Monaco convened meetings in the Situation Room to weigh the mounting evidence of Russian interference and generate options for how to respond. At first, only four senior security officials were allowed to attend: Brennan, Clapper, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch and FBI Director James B. Comey. Aides ordinarily allowed entry as “plus-ones” were barred.
Gradually, the circle widened to include Vice President Biden and others. Agendas sent to Cabinet secretaries — including John F. Kerry at the State Department and Ashton B. Carter at the Pentagon — arrived in envelopes that subordinates were not supposed to open. Sometimes the agendas were withheld until participants had taken their seats in the Situation Room.
Throughout his presidency, Obama’s approach to national security challenges was deliberate and cautious. He came into office seeking to end wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He was loath to act without support from allies overseas and firm political footing at home. He was drawn only reluctantly into foreign crises, such as the civil war in Syria, that presented no clear exit for the United States.
Obama’s approach often seemed reducible to a single imperative: Don’t make things worse. As brazen as the Russian attacks on the election seemed, Obama and his top advisers feared that things could get far worse.
They were concerned that any pre-election response could provoke an escalation from Putin. Moscow’s meddling to that point was seen as deeply concerning but unlikely to materially affect the outcome of the election. Far more worrisome to the Obama team was the prospect of a cyber-assault on voting systems before and on Election Day.
They also worried that any action they took would be perceived as political interference in an already volatile campaign. By August, Trump was predicting that the election would be rigged. Obama officials feared providing fuel to such claims, playing into Russia’s efforts to discredit the outcome and potentially contaminating the expected Clinton triumph.
Before departing for an August vacation to Martha’s Vineyard, Obama instructed aides to pursue ways to deter Moscow and proceed along three main paths: Get a high-confidence assessment from U.S. intelligence agencies on Russia’s role and intent; shore up any vulnerabilities in state-run election systems; and seek bipartisan support from congressional leaders for a statement condemning Moscow and urging states to accept federal help.
In an envelope from the CIA shown to just former President Obama and 3 other aides of his in August 2016, the letter revealed that Putin had a gameplan: defeat (or least severely weaken) Hillary and elect Trump as the 45th President.
Did John Kerry get treated as bad as Hillary Clinton after he lost the Presidency?
No. But Hillary is a Clinton and there’s an entire industry that has been built to hate and hassle the Clintons over the past quarter-century, and the Clintons have seemingly been more than happy to incite that industry from time-to-time. The country wasn’t as divided in 2004 and John Kerry didn’t have the hopes of a huge segment of the population riding on him historically or politically; his election wouldn’t have really been historic in many ways and he was never seen as a potentially transformative leader. Kerry also wasn’t seen as the last line of defense against an ignorant, intolerant, unqualified President with authoritarian tendencies, so it’s not as if we felt he failed us. Democrats weren’t terribly excited to cast their ballots for him in the first place, and Republicans weren’t all that worried about him. Plus, John Kerry graciously conceded to President Bush and went back to work in the Senate rather quickly.
I want to be careful how I put this because people will attack me otherwise, but I think there is a role for Hillary Clinton in public life post-2016. I think there are things that she can do that can help many, many people. But she can’t keep running the 2016 campaign over again and try to justify her loss. There were a lot of reasons for Trump’s shocking victory, but Hillary Clinton’s inability to put together a coherent message that connected with the American people and her positively chaotic campaign organization is right up at the top of that list of reasons. She’s not faultless in what happened. She was a flawed candidate who could never find a way to iron out those flaws and kept tripping over the piles of troubles that she was often guilty of creating. There’s a role for her, but it’s not at that level anymore. She deserves our appreciation and our respect for what she’s done, but she also needs to move on so the party can move forward.
(I guess I wasn’t careful with how I put that after all.)
Kevin Spacey with former Secretary of State John Kerry and other luminaries at the Woodside Gallery Dinner in benefit of Elton
John AIDS Foundation in partnership with BVLGARI at Woodside. June 22, 2017
I think so. It’s probably still a little too early to make a definitive call on it, but I appreciated what he did as Secretary of State. Unfortunately, like President Obama, a lot of the good things that Kerry did or helped begin are being summarily reversed already by the current Administration.
Kerry was fortunate in that he was able to benefit from the fact that President Obama didn’t have any more elections of his own to contest, so he made that transition from first-term, Cautious Obama to second-term, no fucks given, Bulworth Obama. That freed up Kerry to do everything he could to accomplish the Obama Administration’s foreign policy goals. It also helped that Kerry didn’t have any more elections of his own to contest. Kerry wasn’t running the State Department as a potential future Presidential candidate; he was focused on being the nation’s top diplomat (not that Hillary Clinton didn’t do a good job at State from 2009-2013, but 2016 was always first and foremost on Hillary’s agenda and I think that held her and Obama back at times). It was really important that Obama trusted Kerry, which wasn’t guaranteed – remember what happened with Chuck Hagel as Defense Secretary. He was never one of Obama’s guys and even Biden’s support of Hagel wasn’t enough to help in that situation. I think Kerry did a really good job at making some of the bigger foreign policy goals of Obama’s Presidency into realities, and it wasn’t always easy. Quite frankly, President Obama put Secretary Kerry in a tough position when it came to Syria because they weren’t on the same page early on. So, yes, John Kerry was a good Secretary of State.
Ask Ethan: How Can A Nation Have Nuclear Power Without The Danger Of Nuclear Weapons?
“Could you elaborate some of the scientific background on which Dr. Moniz must have briefed Kerry for those talks? Among issues that are sometimes mentioned with little or no explanation are uranium vs plutonium; materials and technology suitable for peacetime energy production vs those suitable only for weapons; breeder reactors; and illegal technology transfer.”
In 1953, then-President Eisenhower, in the aftermath of World War II and with rising tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union resulting in a nuclear arms race, began the “Atoms For Peace” plan. The idea was that all nations should be able to reap the benefits of nuclear power, while simultaneously keeping the world safe from nuclear war. While the same ingredients can be used for both reactors and weapons, uranium and plutonium, there’s are big differences reactor-grade and weapons-grade materials. The largest difference is the concentration of fissile material. When the United States helped broker a deal with Iran to give them nuclear power capabilities while keeping their possibility of creating nuclear weapons at a minimum, it was nuclear physics that sealed the deal. In particular, it was likely unprecedented negotiation on two issues that made it possible: the U-235 and Pu-239 concentrations that would arise from Iran’s nuclear program.