european ultras

Dear SK’s music industry,

as far as I know, South Korea’s education system is one of the most productive and efficient systems in the world. South Korea nearly the highest educated nation worldwide. That being said, I’m extremely sure you are aware that this is a continent

This is Europe.

Not a state, not a country…this is a continent.

When you constantly skip it while scheduling your world tours, may I ask, what’s going on in your mind? I know you know what and where is Europe. I know you know there are plenty of people ready to attend your concerts…..You cannot seriously tell me it’s because you don’t like it. We got everything you want! Just choose one country!






Originally posted by natural-fangirl



anonymous asked:

What are some talking points on why Greece is in the amount of debt it is in?

the structure of the eurozone is completely broken. it privileges germany over its neighbors. germany’s central bank, the bundesbank, has historically been one of the main incubators of neoliberalism (so-called ordoliberalism). this gives it a fundamental adherence to austerity, although not as much in the extreme sense it’s used in america. it values co-operation between workers and management as part of a general social order where everybody knows their place in social hiearchy, and will give concessions to placate unions and prevent upheaval in the form of strikes. however, when it has the power, its desire is also to bulldoze unions to prevent wage increases and thus inflation that might hurt the property holdings of the rich. it was generally agreed upon by the state planners who drew up the drafts for the european union that the main basis of the european central bank would be the bundesbank, as this way each government could both claim that its hands were tied when workers asked for higher wages and if a socialist government came to power, it would in turn find itself unable to set its own monetary policy and push through its objectives. with alan greenspan’s low interest rates in this past decade, there came a flood of american banks looking for easy investments, which in turn made it very easy to get loans. germany, however, also extended its easy credit to foreign banks as it knew most countries they were based in couldn’t afford to buy the exports it was inundating them with. so talking points are as follows:

  • germany created its own crisis by undertaking austerity during an expansion. the only way this can work is if other people buy your own goods, so germany took advantage of its trade surplus with eurozone periphery nations like greece to lend the profits right back to them (private banks and the bundesbank are closely tied, as in any nation) so they could buy more. it’s understandable that this ponzi scheme would some day come back to bite them. this also removes inflation from germany in the sense that it pushes its excess money supply out of the country, meaning workers don’t have to be given any portion of it.
  • most of the money lent went to purchases for the rich. the greek government, for instance, made exorbitant purchases on weaponry to keep the german arms industry afloat. 10% of german weapons sales are to greece, and some of those weapons, like submarines, turned out to be faulty. they also blew tons of money on the olympics, a spectacle for the rich, mostly updating infrastructure that would later be sold to private corporations like soccer teams for pennies on the dollar.
  • banks, both german and greek, were suckered into the same arcane financial instruments that defined the american crisis. credit default swaps on property weren’t as big, but they still played a prime role, as rich europeans looked for second vacation homes and as credit was transferred to greek workers to buy german goods. the biggest issue was the sovereign debt credit swaps on greek government bonds. all this took place instead of investment into fixed capital costs, which would have made greek workers more competitive with german ones, because the fraudulent property bubble was said to provide better returns. the speed of the collapse of the financial system meant that banks didn’t know who owed what, and in turn made them tighten their own fiscal policies, resulting in numerous foreclosures on the greek people’s only assets. as a result, workers were forced to suffer for bank mismanagement.
  • to some degree these fears are motivated by racism. there’s a general association of profligacy with brown skin, and in european terms greeks, spaniards, italians and portuguese are browner than germans, anglos and scandinavians.
  • there are a couple of ways this crisis could be overcome. the best way within capitalism would be the fdr-keynesian solution. use fiscal policy (government expenditures) to invest in make-work programs. workers have money and can buy basic necessities, pushing along the gears of the economy. fixed capital grows, making workers more productive and competitive. the economy grows, meaning debt is less of a burden because everybody can afford to pay it off. this is completely out in the modern era. property owners refuse to be taxed to pay for it and have numerous ways to prevent it (cayman islands bank accounts, etc). bond markets view it as imprudent, irresponsible, a waste of cash because state development leads nowhere in their ideological view (the reality is that they oppose it because of the inflationary cost and the benefits to workers). syriza hopes to short-circuit this by having the european union guarantee greek debt, meaning the bond markets will hopefully invest in such a program simply because the profits will be too good to pass up.
  • the second way would be the argentina route. in 2001 argentina defaulted on its debt, and the bond markets punished it by quarantining the country financially and cutting its exchange rates to minimal levels, horrible for an import-oriented economy. the government embarked on a keynesian import-substition system, well-planned and enacted with the adherence of the majority of local capital hoping to avoid any pain. they also used the weakness of their money to stimulate exports as a new route to gain hard currency. smelling profits, international capital began to flood in, and the bond markets relented. this is likely syriza’s route  if negotiations fail with the german government.
  • now we get to the ways considered normal in modern times. to ensure banks keep lending, countries with control over their currency can use their central bank to print money to give directly to banks through low-interest loans. this was mostly america’s strategy, although they did what they could in the fiscal sphere to give banks money too, within reason considering popular opposition. germany has the ability to do this, but they won’t, as they’re ideologically opposed to it. greece can’t do this, as it can’t print its own money, being part of the eurozone. instead, germany came up with a new solution that would bail out its own banks and greece’s without requiring its central bank to lift a finger.
  • an outside loan, in this case through the ECB and IMF adhering to the usual way of the latter’s activities, would be extended. greek banks would be paid off, in turn allowing german banks to be paid off. subsequently, the greek government would have to pay back the loan, with exorbitant interest, and adhere to a series of measures believed to make it more competitive, typically the reduction of workers to starvation wages, the sale of government assets to investors in order to gain one-time windfall profits, and making taxes more regressive in order to burden workers and not businesses that are the supposed engine of growth. even though there are three better solutions, this one, which will cripple the greek economy for years to come despite what a few cooked books say, was forced upon them by germany. if this is a bailout, it’s not the greek people who are being bailed out.
  • a fifth solution would be to restructure the eurozone in order to increase national sovereignty or decrease german power, but taht’s off the table. as yannis varoufakis stated, (replace french with any eu state)

Their thinking was simple: If the French state forfeited the right to print money (either by reverting to the Gold standard or by adopting the Deutsch mark [i.e. the euro today]), prices would stop rising and the trades unions would lose all bargaining power over employers: with the government unable to boost overall demand, especially during a slump, the trades unions would have a choice between accepting high unemployment (that would destroy their power base) and accepting low wages. In short, by forfeiting the printing presses the French state would ensure that organized labor becomes less militant, more “German”. And if this also meant a greater propensity to recession, it was considered a small price to pay. Today, with France in permanent stagnation under the euro, France’s elites are simultaneously unapologetic, regarding that choice of theirs, and concerned about the rising tide of discontent and anti-European, racist, ultra-nationalism.

people don’t know how to save themselves under the euro now that it’s bulldozed labour power, and they’re turning to the most horrific fascists because of their national chauvinism and their anti-eu credentials. state planners could save themselves from this, but they don’t want to because it might cede power back to the left.

  • germany has shown the most extreme hypocrisy on this. german banks actually own 80% of the debt created by the bailout, meaning that greece had to take out loans ultimately from german banks in order to pay back german banks. another ponzi scheme, this time supported by the now-scant assets of the greek people. in turn, germany eventually did decide there was a good time for the ecb to print money, in 2014, when its own economy was at risk from deflation that was in turn spurred by its own austerity policies. german banks can now take out loans from the ecb at virtually no interest and can buy greek bonds at whatever interest rate they are now (certainly higher than 6% with the impending election). germany’s naked opportunism shows the value of all its previous denunciations of greek spending and its claim to ethical superiority truly means. inflation is starkly needed in the short term, and it would even benefit german workers, but the ideological blinders at the ecb and bundesbank means it’s off the table.