Anyhow, we’ll set the rest of that discussion aside for now, since I want to clarify how I differ from some of the others.
I don’t believe in the purely mind-pattern definition of self.
I don’t see uploads, if possible, as being identical people to the originals. You might be able to Ship-of-Theseus something to cross that causal barrier, but then you have to actually Ship-of-Theseus it to get the appropriate causal entangling.
If I get shot, and you re-instance a brain backup into the blank nervous system of some sort of empty clone doll, I don’t wake up - the clone does.
My suspicion has only grown greater on this with the whole quantum stuff.
…not that having a near-identical clone go on without me isn’t at least somewhat comforting as an idea, but then, so is a nice grave compared to naught at all.