after finitude

There is no reason for anything to be or to remain thus and so rather than otherwise. Everything could actually collapse: from trees to stars, from stars to laws, from physical laws to logical laws; and this not by virtue of some superior law whereby everything is destined to perish, but by virtue of the absence of any superior law capable of preserving anything, no matter what, from perishing.
—  Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency
When I burn myself on a candle, I spontaneously take the sensation of burning to be in my finger, not in the candle. I do not touch a pain that would be present in the flame like one of its properties: the brazier does not burn itself when it burns.

Similarly, the melodious beauty of a sonic sequence is not heard by the melody, the luminous colour of a painting is not seen by the coloured pigment on the canvas, and so on. In short, nothing sensible – whether it be an affective or perceptual quality – can exist in the way it is given to me in the thing by itself, when it is not related to me or to any other living creature. When one thinks about this thing ‘in itself’, i.e. independently of its relation to me, it seems that none of these qualities can subsist. Remove the observer, and the world becomes devoid of these sonorous, visual, olfactory, etc., qualities, just as the flame becomes devoid of pain once the finger is removed.
—  Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude (on secondary qualities) 
There is no reason for anything to be or to remain thus and so rather than otherwise […]. Everything could actually collapse: from trees to stars, from stars to laws, from physical laws to logical laws; and this not by virtue of some superior law whereby everything is destined to perish, but by virtue of the absence of any superior law capable of preserving anything, no matter what, from perishing.
—  Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude (2008)
On the one hand, we acknowledge that the sensible only exists as a subject’s relation to the world; but on the other hand, we maintain that the mathematizable properties of the object are exempt from the constraint of such a relation, and that they are effectively in the object in the way in which I conceive them, whether I am in relation with this object or not.
—  Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency